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Avoid or Compensate? Liability
for Incidental Injury to Civilians
Inflicted During Armed Conflict
Yal Ronen*

ABSTRACT

Under international law, civilians suffering injuries that
are incidental to a lawful attack on a military objective are left
to bear the cost of their losses. In recent years there have been
calls for a change in policy that would entitle victims of military
attacks to compensation, even if their losses are incidental and
non-fault-based. This Article explores the notion of such a
quasi-strict liability rule, which is likely to disrupt the existing
balance of powers and interests under the laws of armed
conflict. Following an exploration of the conceptual basis for
such an obligation, the Article examines the effect of a strict
liability rule on the conduct of parties to a conflict, inter alia
through economic analysis. A final question is how to ensure
that the liability of the injuringparty translates to an effective
mechanism for securing compensation. This Article concludes
that if the moral commitment to victims justifies a strict
liability rule, considerations of utility require a fine-tuning of
the obligation and its implementing mechanisms.
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I. INTRODUCTION: INCIDENTAL INJURY TO CIVILIANS AND THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICT

Civilian injury and death resulting from conflict are by no means
a new phenomenon. 1 However, such injury and death as incidental
outcomes of military attack (hereinafter simply "incidental injury")
have grown more prevalent and visible with new military technology
and changes in warfare. Some of this growth owes to the expansion
of battlefields into "battlespaces"; 2 some of it to the large-scale
involvement of civilians in technical disciplines that support military
operations; 3 and some of it to the escalating frequency of asymmetric
conflicts, where the principle of distinction is less than rigorously

1.
Data on civilian deaths is often absent or inaccurate, and is rarely broken
up by cause. The highest civilian death toll of any single war is that of World War I
(1914-1918): civilian deaths are estimated at 10 million, compared with an estimate for
8.5 million military deaths (and an estimate of 20 million injuries, both military and
civilian). See Britannica Online Encyclopedia, World War I, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/648646/World-War-I (last visited Dec. 21, 2008) (tabulating World
War I deaths, losses, total casualties, etc.). Most civilian deaths were caused by famine

and disease.
World War II data is largely irrelevant for present purposes, because the
overwhelming majority of civilian deaths in that war were caused by genocide. The
following are post-World War II examples.
Korea (1950-1953): Korean (North and South) civilian casualties are estimated
between three and four million, while Korean Military casualty estimates range from
180,000 to 930,000. See Phil de Haan, 50 Years and Counting: The Impact of the

Korean War on the People of the Peninsula, CALVIN COLLEGE NEWS & NOTES, May
(last visited Dec. 21, 2008)
2002, http://www.calvin.edulnews/2001-02/korea.htm
(estimating Korean civilian casualties).
Vietnam (1963-1974): North and South Vietnamese civilian deaths are estimated
at 4 million. News Release Regarding Vietnamese Government's Official Casualty
Count for the Vietnam War, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, April 4, 1995, available at
military
Vietnamese
http://www.chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/casualty.html.
casualties are estimated at 1.1 million. Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Vietnam War,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topid628478/Vietnam-War (last visited Dec. 21,
2008). U.S. and allied casualties are quoted at 300,000. See id. (citing South
Vietnamese military deaths as between 200,000 and 250,000, and listing 58,200
American military dead).
Iraq (2003-present): Documented civilian casualties in Iraq number around 90,000.
See Iraq Body Count, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2008)
(documenting the number of "civilian deaths from violence"). U.S. military and Iraqi
security force losses are documented at about 13,000. Iraq Coalition Body Count,
http://icasualties.org (last visited Dec. 21, 2008).

2.

Michael Schmitt, War, Technology and InternationalHumanitarian Law,

PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL'Y & CONFLICT RES., HARv. U., OCCASIONAL PAPER

SERIES, Summer 2005, at 30.
Kenneth Watkin, Assessing Proportionality:Moral Complexity and Legal
3.
Rules, 8 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 12 (2005).
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observed, especially, but not exclusively, by the technologically
inferior party.
In order to protect civilians from harm, the laws of armed conflict
distinguish between combatants and civilians. The principle of
distinction is expressed foremost in the absolute prohibition on
intentional targeting of civilians expressed in the first Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions.4 Yet the laws of armed
conflict acknowledge the futility of a general prohibition on causing
injury to civilians, because the only way to comply with such a
prohibition and ensure that civilians are not injured is to abstain
from attack altogether. 5 Parties would have a choice between
compliance with the law by refraining from military action and
violation of the law despite their best intentions. The former is
unrealistic, 6 and the latter is unfair. Consequently, civilians are not
entirely immune to attack, and not every injury to a civilian
constitutes a violation of international law. Instead, beyond the
absolute prohibition on intentional targeting of civilians and a
handful of other absolute prohibitions,7 the parties' conduct is
governed by the obligation to minimize harm to civilians, without
setting undue limitations on the pursuit of military goals. 8
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I establishes the general
obligation of parties to take constant care to spare the civilian
population, including individual civilians and civilian objects. 9 It also
provides specific precautions that must be taken in this context: those
who plan or decide upon an attack must "[d]o everything feasible" to
verify that the objectives are legitimate military ones; 10 "[t]ake all

4.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
51(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. The prohibition
on targeting civilians is considered customary in the ICRC Study. JEAN MARIE
HENCKAERTS & LoUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAW VOLUME I: RULES 3 (2005) [hereinafter ICRC Study].
5.
In 1980, Boyle argued that state responsibility does not necessarily imply
an obligation of cessation and that it is flexible enough to encompass an arrangement
based on a balance of interests. Alan E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International

Liability for Injurious Consequences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law: A
Necessary Distinction?,39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 13-14 (1990). However, in the absence
of an institutional mechanism to reach such an arrangement, this possibility remains
theoretical. Moreover, the ILC Draft Article 30(a) provides for cessation as the primary
obligation of an internationally responsible state. ICRC Study, supra note 4, art. 30(a).
6.

THEODOR

MERON,

THE HUMANIZATION

OF INTERNATIONAL

LAw 67-68

(2006).
7.
See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 54(1) ("Starvation of
civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.").
8.
There are other obligations, such as the prohibition on causing unnecessary
pain and suffering. These are irrelevant in the present context.
9.
Id. art. 57(1). This obligation and the specific precautions comprising it are
considered customary in the ICRC Study. ICRC Study, supra note 4, at 51.
10.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 57(2)(a)(i).
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feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack" in
order to minimize loss of, or injury to, civilian life;" give effective
advance warning where circumstances permit; 12 and, among
equivalent options, opt for the one that is least injurious to civilians
while obtaining a similar military advantage. 13 The terms
"feasibility" and "reasonableness" cannot be understood in technical
terms only. If they were, parties would be required to opt for
inaction, which is always feasible and is the only way to truly avoid
incidental injury. Accordingly, these terms must be interpreted as
setting a normative standard of care. Injury to civilians must be
minimized, taking into account all of the circumstances at the time of
the attack, including those relevant to the success of military
operations. 14 In addition, a party must not carry out an attack which
may be expected to cause incidental civilian loss that would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated. 15 The principle of proportionality serves as a base line,
in that even when specific precautions have been taken, civilian
16
injury must never outweigh the military advantage anticipated.
The targeted party is also obligated to take precautions against
the effects of attack. 17 Article 58 of Additional Protocol I requires the
targeted party to endeavor, to the maximum extent feasible, "to
remove the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian
objects under their control from the vicinity of military objectives"; to
"avoid locating military objectives within or near densely populated
areas"; and to "take the other necessary precautions to protect the
civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under
their control against the dangers resulting from military
operations.is
Articles 57 and 58 lay down a due diligence standard. They
resemble rules of negligence in that international responsibility
arises only from failure to comply with a determined standard of care,
as reflected in the obligations to take feasible or reasonable
precaution. If a party fails to comply with this standard and injury

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. art.
Id. art.
Id. art.
Claude

57(2)(a)(ii), 57(4) (using the term "reasonable").
57(2)(c).
57(3).
Pilloud & Jean Pictet, Commentary on Protocol I, Article 57-

Precautionsin Attack, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977
TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 677, 681-82 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,
Tony Langham et al. trans., Martinus Nijhoff 1987) [hereinafter COMMENTARY]. The

Commentary suggests that the difference in use of "feasible" and "reasonable" is
significant but does not explain in what way.
15.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 51(5)(b).
Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
16.
This obligation and the specific precautions comprising it are considered
17.
customary in the ICRC Study. ICRC Study, supra note 4, at 68.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 58.
18.
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occurs, that party's conduct is regarded as negligent and the party is
internationally responsible on the basis of fault. These rules differ
from an ordinary negligence rule in that, under the laws of armed
conflict, an expectation or even certain knowledge that an attack on a
military object would result in injury or death does not automatically
imply fault and does not render the attack wrongful, nor does it give
rise to international responsibility for the attack.
When the attacking party complies with the precautionary
requirements, primarily those of distinction and proportionality, the
causation of injury to civilians is regarded as "unavoidable." The
attack is not a breach of international law and the attacking party
does not bear international responsibility for the resulting injury. 19
Nor is there any other party that is internationally obligated to
provide redress to the individual victim. 20 The victim is left to
shoulder the loss. This result is morally unsatisfactory. 21 Thus, there
22
have been calls from nongovernmental organizations and academics
for a change in policy that would entitle victims of military attacks to
compensation, even if the losses sustained are incidental, i.e.,
unavoidable and proportionate outcomes of attacks on military
objectives.
An obligation on parties to compensate all civilian victims of
military attacks, even when the injury could not have been avoided

19.
See U.N. Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 2(b), U.N. Doc. A/56/10(SUPP) (2001) [hereinafter
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility] (defining elements of an internationally
wrongful act of a state).
20.
The victim may have an Article 58 claim against the party to which it
belongs for failure to take adequate precautions in defense. See generally Additional
Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 58 (detailing requisite precautions against the effects of
attacks).
21.
See Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy
Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81, 99 (2006) (explaining the need for institutional norms that
will lead decision makers, before engaging in combat, to consider the effects of their
actions on enemy civilians); W. Michael Reisman, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALE J.
INT'L L. 381, 397-98 (1997) (discussing moral and legal justifications for collateral
damage compensation).
22.
Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Violations of the lus in
Bello: An Imperfect Balance, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW
CHALLENGES 171, 180 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping, eds., 2007);
Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Reparation for Violations of International Humanitarian
Law, 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 529, 551 (2003); Reisman, supra note 21, at 397-98;
Karl F. Inderfurth, Losing the 'Other War' in Afghanistan?, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May
29, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/29/opinion/edinderfurth.php;
CIVIC-The Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict, http://www.civicworldwide.org
(last visited Dec. 22, 2008). See Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 98-99 (mentioning
different views and pointing out questions yet unanswered). See generally Campaign
for Compensation, http://www.campaign4compensation.org (last visited Dec. 22, 2008)
(comprising Amnesty International USA, CIVIC, EPIC (Education for Peace in Iraq
Center), HRW (Human Rights Watch), NETWORK (A National Catholic Social Justice
Lobby), and VFA (Veterans for America)).
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23
It
by the exercise of due care, is a quasi-strict liability rule.
resembles a strict liability rule in that it places the burden of loss on
the injurer regardless of fault. It differs from an ordinary strict
of injury
liability rule under international law in that the causation
24
does not constitute an internationally wrongful act.
An obligation to compensate all victims of military attacks,
including those injured incidentally, 25 is morally laudable, but it is
likely to disrupt the existing balance of powers and interests under
the laws of armed conflict, and thus requires a more detailed
A preliminary issue, explored in Part II, is the
examination.
conceptual basis for such an obligation. This informs the scope of
arguments in support of and in opposition to the proposed obligation.
Part III examines the effect of the proposed obligation on the conduct
of parties to a conflict. For individual victims, compensation is no
substitute for avoidance of incidental injury because monetary
compensation can never fully reverse the consequences of personal
physical injury. Therefore, if an obligation to compensate is expected
to reduce incidental injury, it promises significant benefits to
potential victims. If, on the other hand, it has an adverse effect on
the protection of civilians, the benefit of an entitlement to
compensation must be weighed against the increased risk of loss. A
separate question, considered in Part IV, is how to ensure that the
liability of the injuring party translates into an effective mechanism
for securing compensation.
In the present context, the term "attacking party" refers to the
instigator of a specific attack. Both parties to the conflict are
invariably attacking parties. The term "military attack" is to be
understood in terms of ius in bello rather than in terms of the overall
engagement in military action under ius ad bellum. 26 This Article
focuses on attacking parties, although in view of the obligation to

23.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 178 (7th ed. 2007).

24.

Causation of injury is a condition for the existence of international

responsibility. See NATHALIE L.J.T. HORBACH, LIABILITY VERSUS RESPONSIBILITY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw: DEFENDING STRICT STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR

TRANSBOUNDARY DAMAGE 3-80 (1996) (providing detailed analysis of the relationship
between liability and responsibility under international law, specifically in the ILC
work).

25.
Liability for fault-based injuries already exists under both the laws of
armed conflict and general principles of state responsibility. Additional Protocol I,
supra note 4, art. 91; Convention (V) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3,
Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]; cf. ICRC Study,
supra note 4, at 530 (outlining state liability for international humanitarian law
violations).
Cf. Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 49 (defining "attacks" and scope
26.
of application). The relationship between ius in bello and ius ad bellum is considered in
Part III.
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take precautions in defense, an injuring state may also be the one
27
acting in defense with respect to a specific attack.
Liability need not in principle be limited to states as opposed to
nonstate actors. Although the greater part of the following discussion
concerns "parties," in certain contexts reference is made to states,
either for convenience or because specific rules only apply to states.
Furthermore, this Article is largely limited to international
armed conflict. Non-international armed conflicts raise specific
issues, in particular those resulting from international human rights
law. Although the applicability of these norms also arises with
respect to international armed conflict, it is less prominent in this
specific context.
Despite the restriction of this discussion to
international armed conflict, this Article addresses the difference
between states and nonstate actors as parties to a conflict in Part III.
One reason to do so is to cover, if only in a limited manner, a conflict
with a nonstate actor that nonetheless transcends national borders. 28

II.

FRAMING AN OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE FOR INCIDENTAL INJURY

The moral underpinnings of an obligation to compensate
incidentally injured (and other) civilian victims of a military attack
are the wrongs caused to the victims. Compensation is a measure of
redress for the violation of the victims' rights to life and bodily
integrity. The injuring party may not be at fault, but the absence of
fault does not relieve it from the obligation to compensate the victim
for the invasion of rights. 29 The legal underpinning of an obligation
to compensate civilian victims may take various forms, discussed in
the following sections.
A. IncidentalInjury as an Excused Breach
Incidental injury may be regarded as a situation where a breach
of international law occurs but the injuring party is exempted from

27.
This choice stems from the fact that in the relationship between a targeted
party and its civilians, human rights law has greater weight, although in view of
Additional Protocol I Article 58, international law is not excluded. See id. art. 58
(referencing Article 49 of the Fourth Convention).
28.
For example, consider the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian
movements. In Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Government of Israel, the
Supreme Court of Israel determined that the law of international armed conflict is the
law applicable to the conflict between Israel and terrorist organizations because the
conflict transcends Israel's borders and is waged between Israel and a militarily
organized movement that is powered like a state. HCJ 769/02 [2005] (Isr.), available at
http://elyonl.court.gov.il/files-eng/02/690/007/A34/02007690.a34.htm.
29.
Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of CorrectiveJustice, 67 IND.
L.J. 349, 355-56 (1991-1992).
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fault by a justification or excuse. The adoption of no-fault liability
reflects a needs-oriented approach in this case, which proceeds from
30
the needs of the victim rather than from the fault of the injurer.
The notion that the invasion of a right is an injury that gives rise
to compensation-even in the absence of wrongfulness-is suggested
31
in Article 27 of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.
Article 27 provides: "The invocation of a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness in accordance with this chapter is without prejudice
to... the question of compensation for any material loss caused by
the act in question. '32 The underlying principle of Article 27 is that
there is no reason why the party harmed by an act should be required
to suffer loss due to the actions of the injuring state, if the injured
33
party did not contribute to, let alone cause, the situation.
When drafting this provision, the ILC was undecided as to the
legal basis for compensation for injuries resulting from acts that are
not wrongful. 34 Accordingly, it did not attempt to elaborate in detail
the basis for compensation. Instead, the matter was covered by an
appropriate "without prejudice" clause. 35 Lowe suggested that the
special circumstances precluding wrongfulness should be regarded as
"excuses" that preclude fault but do not nullify the primary
obligation. 36 This would preserve a basis for entitling the injured
state to compensation from the injuring state, despite the absence of
international responsibility. 37 ILC Special Rapporteur Crawford
confirmed that the mention of compensation in Article 2738 suggested
that at least some of the special circumstances enumerated in
Chapter V of the ILC Draft Articles precluded only responsibility and

30.
Cf. CA 507/79 Raundenaf v. Hakim, [1982] IsrSC 36(2) 757, 770.
Compensation to a soldier, rather than a civilian, was at issue.
31.
See ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, art. 27(b)
("The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in accordance with this
chapter is without prejudice to ...the question of compensation for any material loss
caused by the act in question.").
32.
Id.
33.
James Crawford, Revising the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, 10
EUR. J. INT'L L. 435, 444 (1999).
34.
Int'l L. Comm'n, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work
of Its Fifty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/54/10 (July 23, 1999), reprinted in [1999] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 406, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter ILC
Report]; see Percy E. Corbett, The Search for General Principlesof Law, 47 VA. L. REV.
811, 822-23 (1961) (discussing whether liability for unlawful harm is a general
principle of law).
35.
ILC Report, supra note 34,
421; ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, supra note 19, cmt. art. 27, 1.
36.
See generally Vaughn Lowe, Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A
Plea for Excuses, 10 EUR.J. INT'L L. 405 (1999).
37.
Id. at 410. In this article, Lowe did not explicitly distinguish between
excuses and justifications.
38.
The language currently in Article 27 was then in Article 35. See id.
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not wrongfulness. 3 9 In other words, Article 27(b) opens the way for
an obligation to compensate for an apparent breach of international
law if the absence of fault lies in an excusing circumstance that
precludes responsibility but does not preclude wrongfulness. Article
27(b) only covers situations where the wrongfulness of an act is
precluded by a circumstance enumerated in Chapter V of the ILC
Draft Articles, 4 0 and when it is external to the definition of the
primary obligation. 41 Insofar as other circumstances give rise to an
excuse or justification which precludes international responsibility,
Article 27 can only apply by analogy. For an analogy from Article
27(b) to apply, causing incidental injury must be regarded as a breach
of international law that is excused by overriding circumstances. The
alleged breach would be of the right to life and bodily integrity. The
excuse presumably would be the existence of military necessity
during an armed conflict.
Application of the '%reach and excuse" construction is
inappropriate under the laws of armed conflict. First, the laws of
armed conflict do not expressly guarantee a right to life for
civilians. 42 The duty to respect human life may only be inferred from
the limitations on military attacks. Moreover, under the laws of
armed conflict, military necessity is not a circumstance precluding
43
wrongfulness but an integral part of the law.
Alternatively, the relevance of an analogy from Article 27(b) can
be examined under human rights law. The right to life is guaranteed
in international human rights instruments, 44 but even in a human

39.
In the 1999 draft, the "without prejudice" clause applied only to preclusion
of responsibility due to necessity and distress, Crawford criticized the imprecision of
the distinction between excuses and justifications in the ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility. Crawford, supranote 33, at 444.
40.
Namely, consent, self-defense, countermeasures, force majeure, distress,
and necessity. ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, ch. V, 1.
41.
Crawford, supra note 33, at 445.
42.
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions prohibits "violence to life and
person, in particular murder of all kinds." Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/375?OpenDocument. The words "in particular" imply
that violence to life and person other than murder, such as negligent killing and
injuring, might also be prohibited, unless justified, expressly or implicitly, under rules
on conduct during armed conflict.
43.
Int'l L. Comm'n, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work
of Its Thirty-Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (July 1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 1,
27, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER/A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2); see David
Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of InternationalHumanitarian
Law, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 98 (2005) (discussing the treatment of this issue by the ICJ
in the wall case).
44.
The ICJ confirmed the applicability of international human rights law,
specifically the right to life in times of armed conflict. Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 239 (July 8). The applicability of
international human rights law in occupied territories was confirmed by the ICJ.
Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
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rights context it may not be possible to constrain that right into a
breach and excuse structure. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 6 prohibits the arbitrary deprivation
of life. 45 The test of arbitrary deprivation of life falls under the
applicable lex specialis-namely, the laws of armed conflict. 4 6 This
brings us back to the inapplicability of a breach and excuse structure
to the laws of armed conflict: Because incidental death (i.e., one that
is unavoidable and proportionate) is not considered arbitrary under
this law, the ICCPR does not regard its causation as a violation of the
47
right to life.
Another international human rights instrument that guarantees
the right to life but does not clearly subject this right to the laws of
armed conflict is the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). ECHR Article 2 guarantees one's
right not to be deprived of life unless this deprivation results from the
use of force that is absolutely necessary in enumerated
circumstances.4 8 ECHR Article 15(2) allows derogation from Article 2
"in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war. '49 Article 2
and 15(2) may, therefore, be read respectively as a prohibition and
the excuse of its breach, to which Article 27(b) applies. Interestingly,

I.C.J. 1, 60 (Dec. 19); Legal Consequences in the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 1, 41-44 (July 9).
45.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
46.
Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 239-40.
47.
ICCPR, supra note 45, art. 6 (defining the right to life).
48.
One such circumstance is "in defence of any person from unlawful violence."
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2, Nov.
4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 44, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/
D5CC24A7-DC13o4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf [hereinafter ECHR].
Theoretically, this could cover a military attack designed to protect the civilians of a party
victim of an unlawful use of force under either jus ad bellum or jus in bello. On the other
hand, the European Court of Human Rights has held that "the force used must be strictly
proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in" Article 2(2). McCann v. United
Kingdom, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 39 (1995). The proportionality test suggests that the
prohibition only concerns an intentional deprivation of life. For example, the European
Court of Human Rights has ruled that recourse to potentially deadly force cannot be
considered absolutely necessary when it is known that the person to be arrested poses
no threat to life or limb and is not suspected of having committed a violent offence.
Nachova v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1, 3, 17 (2005). Given that the European Court of
Human Rights has ruled out the use of force against certain individuals regardless of
the fact that such use of force might literally fall within the meaning of Article 2, see
generally UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, EXPERT
MEETING ON THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN ARMED CONFLICTS AND SITUATIONS OF OCCUPATION

(2005), available at http://www.adh.geneva.ch/events/expert-meetings.php (examining
the differences between how international humanitarian law and international human
rights law govern the taking of life), it is doubtful whether Article 2(2) is at all relevant
or even applicable to unintentional killing.
49.
ECHR, supra note 48, art. 15(2).
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the right to bodily integrity is not expressly provided for in any
instrument. 50
Since the excuse of a breach does not annul the primary
obligation but merely removes the wrongfulness of the breach, the
existence of an armed conflict does not grant states blanket
permission to cause incidental injury. It only serves an excuse ex
post facto. 51 An attacking state is not internationally responsible for
causing incidental injury but arguably must compensate the victim
nonetheless.
Failure to compensate incidentally injured victims
would not affect the lawfulness of the attack itself; it would only be a
breach of the obligation to compensate. Thus, the substantive rules
on causing incidental injury to civilians remain intact.
B. IncidentalInjury as an Injurious Consequence of an Act Not
Prohibitedby InternationalLaw
An alternative conceptualization of the obligation to compensate
victims of incidental injury is that the injuring act is simply
permitted under international law. The source of an obligation to
compensate for the injury must therefore exist outside the rules on
state responsibility. Obligations to compensate for consequences of
acts that are not in breach of an international obligation already exist
in discrete areas of international law. Examples are the obligation to
compensate for property duly taken for a public purpose 52 and the
obligation of an occupying power to pay for requisitions in kind and
services from the inhabitants of an occupied territory for the needs of
53
the army of occupation.
A systematic study of the notion of compensation for injurious
consequences of acts not prohibited by international law was
undertaken by the ILC in the late 1970s. This work on "liability,"
under ILC terminology, began as a general question of secondary
rules but was later narrowed to primary rules concerning hazardous
activities that cause transboundary harm to persons, property, or the

50.
Exceptions exist where the violation of bodily integrity constitutes torture,
inhuman or degrading punishment, or medical experimentation; however, these
exceptions are irrelevant for present purposes. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 48, art. 3
(prohibiting torture and inhuman or degrading punishment).
51.
This approach has the advantage of not absolving the party from
responsibility for an injury that was caused during armed conflict but not as a result of
it.
52.
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 19, general cmt. 4(c).
There are other interpretations of this obligation, such as the separate opinion of Judge
Brower in Sedco (Second Interlocutory Award), that if no provision for compensation is
made with the taking or one is made which clearly cannot produce the required
compensation or is unreasonably insufficient, it would seem proper to deem the taking
itself wrongful. Sedco, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 10 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 180,
204 n.34 (1986), reprintedin 25 I.L.M. 629, 648 n.34 (1986).
53.
Hague Convention IV, supranote 25, art. 52.
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environment.5 4 The work of the ILC proceeded on the premise that
the activities in question are essential for economic development and
beneficial to society. For this reason, they are permitted despite
being hazardous.5 5
The 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities provide a due
diligence standard of conduct 56 with respect to prevention and
minimization of risk to significant transboundary harm,5 7 building on
existing customary international law. These Draft Articles are
complemented by the 2006 ILC Draft Principles on the Allocation of
Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous
Activities. The Draft Principles address situations where, despite
compliance with the obligations of prevention and precaution,
accidents occur that cause harm and serious loss in other states. 5 8 In
order to ensure that an innocent victim should not be left to bear the
loss or injury, 59 the Draft Principles place an obligation on states to
provide prompt and adequate compensation for the innocent victims
in the event that their activities give rise to transboundary damage.
This obligation exists independently of any fault on the part of the
injurer.6 0 Importantly, since the activity in question is not prohibited
per se, there is no obligation to cease it. Nor does failure to pay
compensation render the activity illegal; it constitutes an
independent breach of obligation.
The Draft Principles are of particular interest as a model for an
obligation to compensate for incidental injury because quasi-strict
liability builds, conceptually and historically, on a customary
obligation of due diligence. The obligations under Additional Protocol

54.
See Rep't of the Int'l L. Comm'n, 58th Sess., Draft Principles on the
Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous
Activities, princ. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 Draft Principles]
(defining "damage" as "significant damage caused to persons, property, or the
environment"); Rep't of the Int'l L. Comm'n, 53rd Sess., Draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, art. 2(b), U.N. Doc. A/56/10(SUPP)
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 Draft Articles on TransboundaryHarm] (defining "harm" as
"harm caused to persons, property, or the environment").
55.
See 2006 Draft Principles, supra note 54, general cmt. 7 ("[W]hile the
activities contemplated for coverage are essential for economic development and
beneficial to society, the regime must provide for prompt and adequate compensation
for the innocent victims in the event that such activities give rise to transboundary
damage."); id. princ. 4, cmt. 15 ('These activities may have been accepted only for their
social utility and indispensability to economic growth."); 2001 Draft Articles on
Transboundary Harm, supra note 54, pmbl., cmt. 1 (permitting States to "formulate
necessary policies to develop their natural resources and to carry out or authorize
activities in response to the needs of their populations" as long as they "[take] into
account the interests of other States").
56.
2001 Draft Articles on TransboundaryHarm, supranote 54, art. 3, cmt. 7.
57.
Id.
58.
2006 Draft Principles,supra note 54, general cmt. 2.
59.
Id. princ. 3, cmt. 2.
60.
Id. princ. 4(2).
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I to take precaution against injuries to civilians are the equivalent of
the 2001 Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm. An obligation to
pay compensation to civilian victims of attack, regardless of
compliance with the obligation of due diligence, would complement
the provisions of Additional Protocol I and customary law in the same
manner that the 2006 Draft Principles complement the 2001 Draft
Articles on Transboundary Harm.
This analogy is appropriate if the point of departure and
purposes of the Draft Principles are similar to those of the proposed
rule on liability for incidental injury to civilians. The purposes of
liability for injurious consequences of hazardous industrial activities
are defined broadly and include providing incentives to prevent
transboundary damage from hazardous activities, preserving and
promoting the viability of economic activities that are important to
the welfare of states and peoples, and providing compensation in a
manner that is predictable, equitable, expeditious, and costeffective. 61 These objectives also apply to compensation for incidental
injury inflicted during armed conflict.
However, the points of
departure with respect to industrial activities and military attacks
are different. Industrial activity is, on the whole, unregulated under
international law. Although under ius in bello military attacks are
neither permitted nor prohibited but are simply assumed, the use of
force is regulated also by ius ad bellum, which has no equivalent
applicable to industrial activity. 62 Although ius ad bellum and ius in
bello have traditionally been divorced from each other, this
separation is not free of obstacles, as considered in Part III. A more
general critique of the analogy is that placing the financial burden on
the injurer for the consequences of hazardous industrial activities is
heavily influenced by economic considerations, namely the attempt to
optimize conduct through financial incentives. Part III examines the
relevance of this rationale to the laws of armed conflict.
The analogy of environmentally ultrahazardous activities to the
laws of armed conflict has other limitations. Even with respect to the
former, the deterrent effect of liability is feeble. 6 3 This is despite the
facts that such activities lend themselves much more easily to
economic analysis than the laws of armed conflict, that strict liability
is already available under the domestic environmental law of certain

61.
Id. princ. 3, cmt. 10.
62.
Alternatively, industrial activities are by default generally permitted under
international law, unlike the use of force. Cf. 2001 Draft Articles on Transboundary
Harm, supra note 54, pmbl., cmt. 1 (recognizing the freedom of States to "formulate
necessary policies to develop their natural resources and to carry out or authorize
activities in response to the needs of their populations" provided they "[take] into
account the interests of other States").
63.
Michael G. Faure & Andr6 Nollkaemper, International Liability as an
Instrument to Prevent and Compensate for Climate Change, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 123,
141 (2007).
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states, and that strict liability has begun to permeate international
treaties on environmental protection. 64
Many states are still
reluctant to adopt the strict liability principle.
C. Summary
This Part explored conceptual bases for an obligation to
compensate incidentally injured victims of military attacks. The
point of departure was that causation of such injury should not be
transformed into a breach of an international obligation, but that
liability should nonetheless attach to the injuring party. This Part
offered two bases for an obligation to compensate. One is that the
causation of injury is a wrongful act where international
responsibility is precluded by an excuse; the other is that it is an act
not prohibited by international law. In both cases, the injurer is
liable for the injury but not internationally responsible for it.
Adoption of either basis requires both taking a stand on such other
issues as whether international human rights law applies in
situations of armed conflict and focusing more narrowly on the
economic utility of the obligation for guiding parties' conduct.

III. THE EFFECT OF AN OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE FOR INCIDENTAL
INJURY ON THE CONDUCT OF PARTIES TO AN ARMED CONFLICT

A. Economic Analysis and the Laws of Armed Conflict
An obligation to compensate victims of incidental injury has the
direct effect of shifting the cost of such injury from the victims to the
injuring party. It may, therefore, also have an effect on the conduct
of parties to armed conflict. 6 5 This Part examines and evaluates this
effect. The point of departure for this evaluation is that, under the
existing laws of armed conflict embodied in the precautionary
requirements codified in Articles 57 and 58 of Additional Protocol I,
parties should minimize civilian injury with respect to an anticipated
military advantage. 6 6
The question is whether the proposed
obligation enhances such minimization.
A shift in the cost of injury from one party to another may affect
the conduct of parties if they are moved by economic considerations.
It might be argued that states and other parties to armed conflict are
not rational actors and that they are not moved by economic

64.

See, e.g., 2006 Draft Principles, supra note 54, principle 4(2) (stating that

liability for transboundary damage should not require proof of fault).
65.
Cf. POSNER, supra note 23, at 6 (regarding transfer payments that have a
private cost and transactions that affect use of recourses and have a social cost).
66.
See supra Part I.
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considerations, and, thus, an economic analysis cannot apply to
international law in general or to the social costs of the laws of armed
conflict in particular. A separate but related argument is that many
of the goods at stake in international relations, particularly in armed
conflict-national security, human rights, and political standing-are
analysis
making an economic
incommensurable,
relatively
impossible.
In response it is argued that although potential parties to an
armed conflict (and states in general) do not always operate on a
financial basis, they do make cost-benefit calculations. Concededly,
Yet,
the commodities in question are not always monetary.
nonmonetary motives are not unique to these actors, and
incommensurability issues arise even in thoroughly monetized
exchange markets. 6 7 The matter is one of attaching the correct value
An economic analysis may be more
to different commodities.
complicated and require adjustment for application to the laws of
armed conflict, but that does not mean that it is impossible.6 8 One
adjustment that might be suggested concerns the fact that the choices
(and
among incommensurable goods are made in the political
69
sometimes legal) system rather than in the financial market.
Another argument against the application of economic analysis
to the laws of armed conflict is that states and other parties to armed
conflict are motivated primarily or exclusively by concern for their
own welfare or interests, and less or not at all by concern for global
welfare or interests. 70 This is particularly likely in the area of armed
conflict, where self-interest is sometimes perceived as necessarily
precluding the interests of others. It is important to note, however,
that actors at the domestic level also pursue their own welfare and
interests rather than to the aggregate efficiency or optimal
distribution of wealth. The aggregate welfare and optimal conduct
are ensured by a legal dispute-settlement mechanism that establishes
and enforces liability. If potential injurers unilaterally internalize
the costs arising from their own actions, it is because they anticipate

Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of
67.
HumanitarianLaw Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 394, 407 (1999);
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Some Costs and Benefits of Economic Analysis of InternationalLaw,
94 PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L LAW 185, 185-86 (2000); Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, An
Economic Analysis of State and Individual Responsibility Under InternationalLaw, 9
AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 72 (2007).
68.
Cf. Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Public InternationalLaw 6-7 (Univ. Chi.
John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 216, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstractid=564383 (acknowledging that certain simplifying assumptions
may be problematic but arguing that analogous assumptions are made in many economic
models).
69.
Dunoff & Trachtman, supranote 67, at 407.
Sykes, supra note 68, at 6.
70.
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enforcement. 71 International law, particularly the law of armed
conflict, differs from domestic tort law in that it lacks a binding
mechanism of legal determination and enforcement. This is another
element that calls for adjustment in assessing the utility of a strict
liability rule.
An argument of a different order is that even if the laws of
armed conflict can be analyzed under an economic model, they should
not be. An economic analysis is consequentialist and assumes no
absolute rights or wrongs.7 2 Because a cost-benefit analysis of
liability for incidental injury implies that life and physical integrity
are financially negotiable, it may be irreconcilable with the
humanitarian character attributed to the laws of armed conflict,
which posit certain moral imperatives. Specifically, a liability regime
premised on the legality of causing injury gives a seal of approval to
injuring civilians during military conflict.
While the objection to a consequentialist approach to law is
generally defensible, at least if the approach claims to exclude all
other analyses, it is paradoxically weak with regard to liability for
incidental injury. The law as it stands today already suggests that
life and bodily integrity are not absolutely protected and may be
balanced against other interests: injury is permitted if it is
proportionate to the military advantage anticipated, and precautions
should be taken only if they are feasible and reasonable in the
circumstances. Thus, the legitimacy of incidental injury is already
established. The imposition of strict liability is not intended to alter
the substantive laws of armed conflict. The question is whether, by
reallocating the costs of incidental injury from the victim to the
and
injurer, the proposed regime might reduce the risk to civilians
73
thus diminish the perceived moral imperfection of the law.
B. An Incentive to Reduce Activity Levels
Tort liability induces potential injurers to take precaution
against injury. But even a rule of strict liability, which places the
burden of all injuries on the injurer, does not purport to induce an
injurer to avoid the activity altogether merely because it might cause
injury and give rise to liability. 74 It only promotes an efficient
avoidance of injury, namely when the cost of injury is higher than the
anticipated benefit. If adjudication of tort cases were based on full

Or, the cost is internalized because this internalization is itself valuable to
71.
them.
See Dunoff, supra note 67, at 186 (criticizing consequentialism).
72.
73.
The assumption is that the victim's state does not provide compensation.
See infra Part IV.
74.
Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1056-57 (1972).
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and perfect information and were administratively costless,
negligence and strict liability would produce identical results in
terms of the parties' conduct. 75 In both cases, injurers only invest in
precautions if they are less costly than the anticipated damages. 76
However, the parties are rarely perfectly informed, and adjudication
is not costless. This limits the ability to monitor accurately whether
the conduct of a party is optimal-which, under the laws of armed
conflict, means minimizing civilian injury with respect to an
anticipated military advantage. If the standard for liability is one of
negligence, which requires proof of fault-i.e., suboptimal conductthe injuring party can evade liability because of these limitations.
77
Strict liability mitigates the chances of evasion.
An accurate evaluation of a party's conduct requires the
monitoring of two elements. One is the standard of care applied in
the specific instance in which the activity is carried out. In military
attacks, this refers to, inter alia, the weapons used, the timing of
attack, and the possibility of advance warning. The other element is
the level of activity-namely, the frequency or intensity with which
an activity is undertaken. This refers to whether an attack on a
specific site is launched in the first place, regardless of whether it is
carried out in compliance with the precautionary requirements.
Monitoring the level of activity is particularly important when the
standard of care cannot be changed, or when a change is regarded as
prohibitively costly (e.g., if it requires the development of new
78
weapons or the sacrifice of the lives of the state's military forces).
Domestic courts rarely try to identify the optimal level of
activity. They do not inquire whether the benefit of the particular
activity was equal to or greater than its costs, including losses
incurred as a result of the activity, or whether an alternative was
available that was equally beneficial but less risky to civilians.
Instead, they limit their inquiry to the care taken in the specific
instance of activity once it was undertaken. In consequence, under a
negligence rule, an injurer can escape liability by conforming to the
legal standard of care in a specific instance, regardless of whether
engaging in the activity in the first place was optimal. This is a
serious shortcoming of a negligence rule.79 In contrast, a strict
liability rule, which places the burden of all injuries on the injurer,
incentivizes the injurer to set every variable affecting the probability

75.
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 325 (4th ed. 2004).
See generally POSNER, supra note 23, at 178-82.
76.
Calabresi & Hirschoff, supranote 74, at 1057.
77.
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 65-66 (1987).
78.
A change may also be injusticiable. From a legal perspective, the point is
the inability to monitor the standard of care, regardless of the reason for this inability.
79.
POSNER, supra note 23, at 178.
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of injury at its optimal level, including both the standard of care and
80
the activity level.
Article 57(3) of Additional Protocol I specifically addresses the
problem of activity level in attacks. It provides that "[w]hen a choice
is possible between several military objectives for obtaining a similar
military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the
attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian
lives and to civilian objects."8 1 In other words, when determining
whether the conduct of a party to a conflict was negligent or not, that
party's activity level-the choice to launch the attack as opposed to
how it was carried out- may legitimately be scrutinized. But Article
57(3) does not, indeed cannot, overcome the practical difficulty in
reaching such a determination. Thus, despite the existence of Article
57(3), a rule of strict liability that incentivizes the attacking party to
unilaterally internalize the costs of its activity level attenuates the
distortion caused by the inadequacy of the legal process to monitor
the activity level. It thus enhances optimal conduct as defined above
and eliminates the need for a judicial determination whether the
activity level was in excess of the optimal.
The inability of a judicial body to monitor the level of activity is
actually one aspect of a general problem of information. After all,
given enough time and resources, a court could determine whether a
certain level of activity was optimal or not. It is not required to do so
because the costs involved in obtaining relevant information and
processing it are prohibitive. A strict liability rule serves as a blanket
substitute for such expenditure. The information challenge with
respect to armed conflict is particularly great, because even the
standard of care adopted by the parties can escape judicial scrutiny.
Leaving aside the costs of obtaining the relevant information,8 2 the
determination of the proportionality between the injury to civilians
and the anticipated military benefit is particularly difficult because it

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 75, at 332; A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
80.
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 51-52 (3rd ed. 2003); POSNER, supra note 23,
at 178. The difficulty in monitoring the activity level might also allow an accident
victim to escape responsibility for contributory fault. In the case of military attacks,
however, this is a moot issue. The victim, whether an individual or the state, can take
greater or less precaution but has little control over the extent or frequency of military
attacks. A targeted party cannot realistically be required to reduce the number of its
military objectives as a means of reducing the risk of incidental injury. Even if there
were such a requirement, this would not necessarily reduce military targeting. Thus,
the activity level of the targeted party, let alone of its civilians, is hardly something
that can be changed and need not be monitored. See infra Part III.E on conflicts with
non-state actors.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 57(3).
81.
Considerations of minimizing litigation costs generally support reliance on
82.
a strict liability rule, if the relative costs are measured per case.
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is subjective.8 3 It depends on culture and values, 8 4 on changing
military and political objectives,8 5 and even on a party's perception of
The
its combat situation in comparison with the adversary.8 6
discretion of a party can rarely be critiqued externally on such
matters,8 7 which is why military operations are ordinarily regarded
as nonjusticiable in domestic courts.88 Because it is seldom possible
to determine whether a military party complied with the optimal
standard of care and whether appropriate precautions had been
taken, a negligence rule may effectively result in the victim's inability
to recover for its injuries. A rule of strict liability that places the cost
of injury on the injuring party mitigates the inadequacy of the
It ensures the correct attachment of
judicial determination.8 9
liability in cases where there was fault, but at the price of attaching
the liability to the injurer also in cases where there was no fault. One
example of this phenomenon is NATO's military campaign in Serbia
in 1999. The debate over whether NATO forces utilized appropriate
precautions or carried out their attacks negligently-e.g., by using air
strikes rather than ground forces-may continue indefinitely. 90 If the

83.
Cf. William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in
Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 102-06 (1982) (discussing what may be
considered "proportional" and "excessive" when comparing civilian losses with military
advantages); Lionel K. McPherson, Excessive Force in War: A "Golden Rule" Test, 7
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 81, 91 (2006).
For example, do "feasible" measures to avoid civilian losses include risking
84.
the lives of combatants? Benvenisti, supra note 21, at 82.
85.
For an overview of questions, see Dale Stephens & Michael W. Lewis, The
Law of Armed Conflict-A Contemporary Critique,6 MELB. J. INT'L L. 55, 69-77 (2005).
Cf. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 51 (discussing how technological advantages
86.
can enter into a party's proportionality determinations).
87.
Torsten Stein, Collateral Damage, Proportionality and Individual
InternationalCriminal Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING

NEW CHALLENGES 157, 160 (discussing the application of the proportionality principle
in an international criminal setting).
See, e.g., Shaw Savill v. Commonwealth (1940) 66 C.L.R. 344 (Austl.)
88.
(holding that allegations of military negligence were not justiciable by domestic courts
if the acts were committed in the conduct of war). But see HCJ 4764/04 Physicians for
Human Rights v. IDF Gaza Strip Military Commander [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 385 (holding
that although judicial review does not examine the wisdom of the decision to engage in
war, it may examine the legality of that activity); Bici v. Ministry of Defence [2004]
E.W.H.C. 786 (Q.B.), T 112-13 (Eng.) (holding that the Army is liable for negligence
"even where the victims are from the very community which has benefited so much
from the Army's assistance").
89.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 200-02 (1981). This is
part of Posner's explanation for the prevalence of strict liability in the tort law of
primitive societies, which he identifies as scientifically ignorant and judicially lay.
90.
See, e.g., Paul Robinson, Ready to Kill but Not To Die, 54 INT'L J. 671, 671
(1999) (analyzing the morality of NATO's strategy in Kosovo). The claims of the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) against NATO members (Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom,
United States of America) were dismissed on the ground that the ICJ had no
jurisdiction. See International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=yus&case=l14&k=25 (last visited Dec. 22, 2008) (listing
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standard were that of strict liability, NATO states' liability would be
largely self-evident.
But a simple strict liability rule also has its limitations. It
induces only the injurer to internalize the cost of injury. The victim
is compensated regardless of its actions and therefore has no
incentive to take precautions. When the victim is in a position to
reduce the chances of harm, as envisaged in Article 58,91 this
disincentive is a significant drawback of a strict liability rule. The
nonreciprocity of the laws of armed conflict 92 exacerbates the
problem. The targeted party actually has an incentive to create
obstacles for the attacking party by failing to take precautions, such
as distancing its civilians from military objects. 93 To counter this
disincentive, a defense of contributory fault must be added to the
strict liability rule.94 Then the liability of the injuring party is
limited to the extent that the targeted party fails to take efficient
precautions, and both sides have incentives to optimize their
conduct. 95 Strict liability for incidental injury differs in this respect
from liability for transboundary harm caused by hazardous activities,
96
which is premised on the unilateral nature of the injury.
Returning to whether a strict liability rule can resolve judicial
inadequacies, it is clear that this is not the case when a defense of
contributory fault is available, because this defense reintroduces the
need to determine fault-in this case, the fault of the victim. This
might result in a slight shift of the argument over negligence, but not
in its disappearance. For example, there are claims that, in its
military campaign in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, Israel failed to
take appropriate precautions for the protection of Lebanese

links to information about these cases). On the link between jus ad bellum and jus in
bello responsibility, see infra Part III.C.
91.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 58.
92.
Id. art. 51(8).
93.
Such conduct, when carried out intentionally, is a violation of the laws of
war and outside the scope of this inquiry. Id. art. 51(7).
For convenience, the term "strict liability" will subsequently signify strict
94.
liability with a defense of contributory fault. In certain domestic jurisdictions, a
defense of contributory fault may negate the injurer's liability altogether. The present
discussion assumes that liability can also be partially limited, depending on the
relative fault of each party.
95.
POLINSKY, supra note 80, at 49. A defense of contributory fault is also
available under a rule of negligence. Under domestic Anglo-American tort law,
contributory fault cannot be a complete defense because, if the victim is fully
responsible for the injury, this implies no causation between the act of the "injurer" and
the injury and thus no liability for the "injurer." The role of a defense of contributory
fault, particularly in the context of military attacks, requires separate, detailed
analysis.
See 2006 Draft Principles, supra note 54, princ. 4, cmt. 13 (discussing the
96.
"polluter-pays principle").
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civilians. 97 A strict liability rule would have required Israel to pay
compensation to the victims regardless of the sufficiency of
precautions. However, Israel claims that the high rate of civilian
casualties was caused by the failure of Hizbollah fighters to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. 98 Questions of
contributory fault immediately emerge, reintroducing the indefinite
debate on negligence, this time with respect to the targeted party.
Finally, the advantages of a strict liability rule as regards the
inadequacies of a judicial claims mechanism are also significant when
such a mechanism is altogether absent. The rule allows a relatively
simple determination of liability, subject to the complications raised
by a defense of contributory fault, when no court is available for
99
making such a determination.
C. A Disincentive to Take Action and the lus ad
Bellum/Ius in Bello Distinction
The preceding discussion concerned the role of a strict liability
rule in monitoring excessive activity (i.e., the number or frequency of
military attacks), even if that activity is carried out in accordance
with the optimal standard of care (i.e., through implementation of
appropriate precaution).
The converse problem, namely, a
suboptimal activity level, must also be considered.
Any liability rule that obligates an injuring party to compensate
victims has the potential of deterring that party from taking any
action that generates unwanted costs. In fact, deterrence is one of
the objectives of an obligation to compensate. Problems may arise if
the social cost of reducing the activity level is greater than the harm
avoided through that reduction. This raises a general question of tort
law-namely, whether a potential injurer can be required to raise its
level of activity and at the same time take greater precaution. 0 0 The
laws of armed conflict add additional elements to the question.
Military attacks can be examined at two levels. One is as a ius in
bello issue governed by Article 57. In this limited context, it is

97.
See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, IsRAELLEBANON OUT OF ALL
PROPORTIoN-CIvILLANs BEAR THE BRUNT OF THE WAR 1 (2006), available at

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE02/033/2006
("Amnesty
International
found that Israeli forces had committed indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks,
pursuing a strategy which appeared intended to punish the people of Lebanon.").
98.
ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PRESERVING HUMANITARIAN
PRINCIPLES WHILE COMBATING TERRORISM: ISRAEL'S STRUGGLE WITH HIZBULLAH IN THE

LEBANON WAR 6-7 (2007), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-+Hizbullah/Preserving%20Humanitarian
%20Principles%2OWhile%2OCombatingOo20Terrorism%20-%2OApril%202007.
99.
There remains the need for enforcement. See infra Part IV.
100. One might also consider whether the potential injurer could compensate
the victims of its failure to take that precaution. Cf. DAVID GILO & EHUD GUTTEL,
LIABILITY FOR INSUFFICIENT RISKS (2008).
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arguable that the fewer attacks parties carry out in pursuance of a
specific military advantage, the better. 01' However, military attacks
can also be examined as part of a larger scheme of military
engagement under ius ad bellum, where minimization of attacks
through inaction is not necessarily the optimal course of conduct.
In this context, three situations must be distinguished. The first
is when the injuring party is an aggressor. If potential liability for
avoidable or incidental injuries deters it from engaging in the use of
force, this is highly welcome. The second situation is when the
potentially injuring party is acting in self-defense. In this case, it is
unlikely that the liability for injury to enemy civilians would deter it
from engaging in military action. It is immaterial whether liability is
strict or fault-based. Furthermore, in economic terms, the stakes for
the party acting in self-defense are so high that they unquestionably
outweigh the cost of avoiding incidental injury to enemy civilians by
total inaction.10 2 The potential consequences include both the state's
political survival and the lives of its own civilians. No party is likely
to sacrifice its own civilians for the benefit of the adversary's
civilians.' 0 3 By analogy, the cost of incidental injury can be said to be
proportionate to the political advantage anticipated.
The third situation is when the injuring party is acting in
collective self-defense, under Chapter VII authorization, 10 4 or for
humanitarian purposes.' 0 5 Here too, there is a requirement of
proportionality. The content of the proportionality requirement with
respect to action under Chapter VII authorization presumably differs
in accordance with the circumstances of that action. Proportionality
is required between the danger to civilians which is to be thwarted

101.

Arguably a higher level of activity, in compliance with the determined

standard of care, could be required in order to shorten a war. However, under existing

law, the expected military benefit, civilian loss, and the proportionality between them
are all measured with respect to individual attacks and not to the overall conflict. See,
e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 57(3).
102.
This calculation maximizes national benefit. In a calculation of global
benefit, the importance of defeating an aggressor permits a greater number of civilian
casualties (so long as individual attacks comply with the requirements of Additional
Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 57).
103.
Benvenisti points out that parties are under an obligation both to ensure
the rights of their own nationals and to respect enemy nationals. Benvenisti, supra
note 21, at 87. Thus, although civilians are entitled to human dignity and to the right
to life, regardless of their nationality, as a matter of jus in bello, the duty to respect
enemy civilians is subject to the legitimately dominant goal of each party to protect its
own civilians. Id. at 89. This theory is equally true with respect to aggressor parties
and intervening parties, except that the risk to one's civilians is far less obvious. At any
rate, the argument here is positivist, rather than normative.
104.
U.N.Charter art. 7.
105.
For present purposes, the assumption is that military intervention for
humanitarian purposes is permitted outside Chapter VII authorization.
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and the force used.' 0 6 The scale, duration, and intensity of the
planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to
secure the humanitarian objective in question. The means must be
commensurate with the ends and in line with the magnitude of the
original provocation. 10 7 With respect to humanitarian intervention,
the original provocation must be a large scale loss of life or other
08
serious human rights violation, such as ethnic cleansing.1
In this third situation, unlike in a situation of individual selfdefense, recourse to force is elective. States, the only actors to which
self-defense, Chapter VII action, and humanitarian intervention are
applicable, have the luxury of choosing whether to intervene
militarily. They will naturally balance their own costs against their
own benefits without maximizing global welfare. Had there been a
general obligation10 9 to engage in military action in these
situations,1 1 0 potential intervener states would have calculated the
cost of intervention-risk to their forces and possibly civilians, costs
of using weaponry, etc.-against the cost of failing to do so, including
the responsibility for the loss of civilian life as a result of the failure
to intervene. 1
Such an obligation could have induced states to
intervene.11 2 However, international law does not obligate states to
intervene. They are free to ignore the cost of their own nonintervention.1 1 3 The risk of liability, particularly if it cannot be
avoided even by adhering to an optimal standard of care, may deter
good Samaritan states from taking action. This indicates that a strict
liability rule discourages conduct that is optimal under ius ad bellum.
Since the exceptional permission to use force implicitly assumes
that, overall, such use is beneficial to the international community,
an exception might be appropriate to prevent liability for incidental
injury from deterring states from such use of force. In other words,

106.
See Robin Cook, Sec'y of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Aff., Address
before the A.B.A. (July 19, 2000), in [2000] 71 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 646, 647.
107.
INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION
& STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 37 (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/
Commission-Report.pdf [hereinafter THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT] (requiring the
use of force to be proportional with the possibility of achieving a humanitarian
purpose).
108.
Id. at 32-33.
109.
That is, as opposed to a potential bilateral treaty obligation.
110.
With respect to the humanitarian intervention, there is at most a
responsibility to protect (R2P). THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 107, at
11-18.
111.
Although the right to intervene in international law is only vaguely
defined, it is based on the need to prevent or halt a large-scale catastrophe. Cook,
supra note 106, at 647. A cost-benefit calculation of the need to intervene would thus
assume a large number of lives potentially saved. Id.
112.
Again, this assumes a mechanism for enforcing states' liability. See infra
Part IV.
113.
The immediate cost would be the loss of life in another state. Inaction may
also have nonmonetary costs, such as reputation.
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the obligation itself could be limited to military operations carried out
in violation of ius ad bellum.
Such a link was made ex post facto with respect to Iraq's liability
for consequences of its invasion of Kuwait in 1990-1991.114 Security
Council Resolution 687 reaffirmed that Iraq was "liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage ...or injury to foreign
Governments, nationals and corporations as a result of its unlawful
invasion and occupation of Kuwait." 115 Liability thus attached to
Iraq for losses caused by its military action, including injuries to
civilians, regardless of whether that action was in compliance or
violation of ius in bello. 116 Compensation was obtained from Iraq
through the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), an
ad hoc institution established under Security Council Resolution
687.117

Hypothetically, Iraq's liability could be regarded as strict with
respect to the injurious consequences of acts not in violation of ius in
bello, in application against a state that had violated ius ad bellum.
In practice, the Security Council imposed liability in direct
consequence of Iraq's international responsibility for the violation of
ius ad bellum. In this respect, it is not liability despite the absence of
wrongfulness but liability based on an expansive definition of
wrongfulness.
The liability imposed on Iraq is unique, as is the UNCC
mechanism for extracting the monies. It followed the first time that
the Security Council had called for measures under Article 42 of the
UN Charter in forty years;lis it came at a singular moment of
instability of global political polarity; and it was based on a rare
convergence of cross-cutting political interests. This is, therefore, an
unlikely precedent for an obligation of strict liability for injuries to
civilians.
The link between ius ad bellum and ius in bello has important
drawbacks, which, in the specific case of Iraq, were of little practical
significance. First, linking compensation to the legality of military

114.
There are other examples of reparations exacted from aggressor states after
the termination of a conflict, for example, from Germany under the 1919 Treaty of
Versailles and following World War II, and from Japan under the Peace Agreement of
1951. However, given the absence of a clear general prohibition on the use of force until
the termination of a conflict, the linkage ofjus ad bellum and jus in bello in the cases of
Germany and Japan is not instructive for present purposes.
115. S.C. Res. 687, 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
116.
John R. Crook, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A New
Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 144, 146-48 (1993). For a

discussion of this mechanism as the extension of responsibility from the violation ofjus
ad bellum to all its consequences, including the consequences of acts that may have
been lawful under jus in bello. See Yael Ronen, Illegal Occupation and Its
Consequences, 41 ISR. L. REV. 201 (2008).
117.
S.C. Res. 687, supra note 115, 18.
118.
U.N. Charter art. 42.
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action under ius ad bellum undermines the basic tenet of ius in
bello-namely, to protect all civilians regardless of the justification
for each party's involvement in the conflict. The distinction between
ius ad bellum and ius in bello is premised on the assumption that
even aggressor parties can conduct their warfare humanely. 119
Conversely, one must take into account the possibility that a party
resorting to force lawfully may nonetheless conduct its warfare
inhumanely. 120
If strict liability enhances adherence to lawful
warfare, then it is no less pertinent to a lawful intervener than to an
illegal aggressor.
An exemption of a party from strict liability also undermines the
purpose for which the rule of strict liability was suggested in the first
place, i.e., prompt and adequate redress to victims of attack. If the
entitlement to compensation is subject to normative considerations
such as whether ius ad bellum was violated or not, the prospects of
individuals receiving any compensation grow remote. The indefinite
debate over fault would only shift from the specific attack to the
overall engagement in military action. In this respect too, the case of
Iraq is unique because the identification of the aggressor party was
unanimous (with the exception of Iraq, of course). In the absence of a
general binding mechanism for determination of responsibility under
ius ad bellum, an entitlement to compensation that depends on such
a determination may be illusory.
One way to exempt the lawful intervener from liability without
doing so at the expense of civilians is to establish a right for the
intervener to claim its losses from the aggressor through separate
proceedings.' 2 ' However, the potential benefit of such a cause of
action should not be overestimated. If a party's decision to engage in
military action is in practice influenced by the risk of liability for
incidental injury, it is unlikely to change on the basis of an
entitlement to sue the aggressor. Such an entitlement may also be
illusory, given the absence of a binding dispute settlement
mechanism for deciding such a claim, and extralegal constraints on
bringing a claim, such as the aggressor's exiting the armed conflict
victorious.
Because compensation for incidental injury was claimed only
from Iraq and not from the victorious coalition parties, the question

119.

Antoine Bouvier, Assessing the Relationship Between Jus ad Bellum and

Jus in Bello: An "Orthodox" View, Address Before the Panel on the Relationship
Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Past, Present and Future (Mar.30, 1989), 100
AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 109, 109-11 (2006).
120.
For example, the United States' involvement in World War II was
permissible for self-defense, but its bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima was not
clearly lawful.
121.
Such a claim could cover much more than the cost of compensation paid to
incidentally-injured civilians. It could encompass all losses incurred as the result of a
conflict for which the claimant party was not responsible.

20091

LIABILITY FOR INCIDENTAL INJURY IN ARMED CONFLICT

207

arises whether the UNCC mechanism incorporated a recouping
element, as suggested here, whereby claims of injury resulting from
action by the coalition forces were compensated by Iraq as the party
responsible for the violation of ius ad bellum. The answer must be
negative. First, Iraq was only held liable for "direct" loss, excluding
loss caused by other parties to the conflict. 122 Second, compensation
was only offered to Kuwaiti and third-party nationals, not to
Iraqis. 1 23 Thus, to the extent that Iraqis were injured by coalition
forces, they remained without remedy at the international level.
Rather than incorporating a recouping mechanism, the establishment
of the UNCC reflects a complete exemption of the coalition parties
from liability.
To conclude, for the same reason that the use of force is not
absolutely prohibited in international law, it is arguable that the
financial burden embodied in the proposed rule is not beneficial with
respect to potential lawful intervention. The choice appears to be
between the lesser of two evils: If we are more disturbed by excessive
injury to civilians in conflicts that do take place, then a rule of strict
liability is preferable; if we are more disturbed by the loss of civilian
life caused by the failure of states to take military action, then
maintenance of the existing fault-based liability rule is preferable.
D. The DistinctionBetween Legal and Illegal Attacks
The discussion up to the present point has assumed that the cost
of injury is sufficiently high to have a deterrent effect on engagement
in military action under ius ad bellum or on launching specific
attacks under ius in bello. One possible objection to an obligation to
compensate for incidental injury may be that the cost of injury is so
low that it would have the opposite effect. 124 Strict liability for
injury, covering also incidental injury, might remove the parties'
incentive to act legally and obviate the distinction between legal
attacks (accompanied by appropriate precaution) and illegal ones
(where precautions are inappropriate or absent). The entitlement to
compensation might erode the distinction between wrongful injuries
and non-wrongful ones, with parties contending that they can make
right what they have done through compensation, buying their way
out of adherence to the principle of distinction. This would not only
affect the choice of tactics in individual instances but would
undermine the laws of armed conflict altogether.

122.
S.C. Res. 687, supranote 115,
16.
123.
Id.
124.
See infra Part IV (discussing why the cost of injury might have to be
regarded as a given before it occurs, rather than later in deciding the appropriate level
of compensation to redress an injury or to deter future injuries).
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The principal answer to this concern is that, fortunately, parties
to a conflict are motivated not only by financial considerations.
Indeed, if the decision whether to uphold the principle of distinction
was dependent on financial accountability alone, no state would have
upheld it even to date because, barring a few exceptions, states have
not been held financially accountable for armed conflict since World
War 11.125 Thus, the incentive to violate the law is countered by
nonfinancial forms of enforcement.
If an obligation to compensate incidentally injured victims of
military attacks is adopted and a party consequently forgoes
precautions altogether (or, for that matter, miscalculates the costbenefit ratio), it will be not only liable for all injuries-including
unavoidable, incidental ones-but also internationally responsible for
violating the laws of armed conflict, with whatever consequences such
126
responsibility entails.
Failure to protect civilians adequately may also entail individual
criminal responsibility, such as when a party not only ignores the
requirement to take precaution but intentionally targets civilians.
The criminal character of the injury can also be given weight in the
context of compensation owed when the international responsibility of
127
states is invoked, in the form of punitive damages.
Finally, if parties to armed conflicts make (or can be induced to
make) cost-benefit calculations, there is no reason to assume that
only direct monetary expenditures are included in that calculation.
Illegal targeting of civilians (particularly if it is criminally
sanctioned) has other consequences that the parties take into
consideration, such as their international reputation 128 and internal
public opinion. Illegal conduct can draw criticism, condemnation,
retaliation, and sanctions. These consequences can be factored into
the cost of injury, 12 9 in which case the cost of causing illegal injury is

125.
The ICJ has held Uganda liable for violations of international law against
Congo, including jus in bello. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 1, 102 (Dec. 19). Eritrea and Ethiopia have been
held liable to each other for violations of international law, including jus in bello, by
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. W. Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related
Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), Eri. Eth. Claims Comm'n (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/FINAL%20ER%20FRONT%20CLAIMS.pdf; W. and
E. Fronts (Eth. v. Eri.), Eri. Eth. Claims Comm'n (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005), available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/FINAL%20ET%20FRONT%20CLAIMS(1).pdf.
126.
This responsibility extends to all injuries, even those that were
unavoidable.
127.
Reisman, supra note 22, at 398.
128.
Cf. Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law (U. Cal.
Berkeley Pub. L. Working Paper No. 1112064, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1112064.
129.
In domestic law, they rarely are, probably because they are difficult to
quantify. In international law, they differ little from other costs that are difficult to
quantify.
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significantly higher than the cost of causing incidental injury. In
such a scenario, the alleged disincentive to distinguish between the
two does not arise.
E. Conflicts with Non-State Actors
A growing share of armed conflicts around the world are
asymmetric. 30
The asymmetry may consist of a disparity in
technological power, which often translates into a disparity in
compliance with the laws of armed conflict. It may also consist of
differences in legal status, when the conflict is between a state and a
non-state actor. The extreme violation of the laws of armed conflict,
namely the deliberate and systematic targeting of civilians, is usually
characteristic of non-state actors, 131 but the two asymmetries are not
identical. A non-state actor may conduct its warfare in compliance
with the laws of armed conflict, while a state actor may violate the
same laws.
132
Since existing mechanisms currently limit liability to states,
the question arises whether expansion of liability exacerbates the
asymmetry between states and non-state actors. It is important to
distinguish in this context between two aspects of this alleged
imbalance.
One is the obligation to pay compensation when
incidental injury is caused. The other is the effect of the asymmetric
liability on the conduct of the parties.
There is already an asymmetry between a state, which can be
held liable for injury to civilian members of the non-state actor, and
the non-state actor, which cannot be held liable for injury to civilians
of the other party. 133 As long as in there are no claims against either
party in practice, this asymmetry remains theoretical. If a rule of

130.
BRAD ROBERTS, INST. FOR DEF. ANALYSES, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION
AGENCY: ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 2010 (2000).

131.
John McNee, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations,
Statement to the Security Council on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (June
22, 2007), availableat http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/prmny-mponulcanadauncanada-onulstatements-declarations/security-councilconseil-securite/9890.aspx?lang-eng.
132.
That is, unless the non-state actor falls within the purview of Additional
Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 96, para. 3, but no such non-state actor exists at the time
of writing. The actions of a non-state actor might also entail state responsibility if that
non-state actor subsequently establishes itself as the government of an existing or new
state. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
Commentaries, G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001),
corrected in U.N. Doc. A/56/49(Vol. I)/Corr.4, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001 .pdf.
133.
Asymmetry assumes that one party is a state and the other is not. If both
are non-states, then symmetry reigns again.

210

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:'181

strict liability results in claims actually being brought against
parties, 134 the asymmetry would become operative and visible.
Another aspect of the asymmetry of liability is its impact on the
conduct of parties to a conflict. With respect to specific attacks, the
question now is whether the conduct of the state party is affected by
the non-state party's exemption from liability and vice versa. Insofar
as conduct in attack is concerned, the answer with respect to the
state actor appears to be negative. For example, there is no reason to
assume that Israel's attacks on Hizbollah during the war in Lebanon
in 2006 were in any way affected by the knowledge that Hizbollah
would not be held internationally liable for injuries caused to Israeli
civilians. As for the non-state actor, the answer to this question may
depend on various circumstances.
For example, one might ask
whether Hizbollah's attacks on Israel were guided by the knowledge
that Israel could be held liable for wrongful injuries to Lebanese
civilians and, hypothetically, if the obligation to compensate for
incidental injury were adopted, for non-wrongful injuries. Generally
stated, a non-state actor may find it expedient to provoke the state
party into a military engagement that entails financial liability in
order to achieve political gains, even while exposing its own civilians
to physical harm. This is particularly true if the non-state party does
not fear that similar measures would be adopted toward itself. The
launching by a party of provocative attacks 135 is probably too distant
from the direct attacks against the same party to be regarded as
conduct contributing to the damage caused by each of those direct
attacks individually. The party resorting to such measures thus has
little to lose in terms of international liability.
However, the defense of contributory fault may have significant
application to a party's precautions in self-defense. Such a defense
may already exist under prevailing law, which reflects a standard of
negligence. But since no international claims for civilian injury are
brought at present, they do not reach the point where this defense
can be raised. If a strict liability rule is adopted and claims actually
follow, the defense of contributory fault will take on greater
significance. Any party that does not take appropriate defensive
13 6
precautions will then deprive its own civilians of compensation.
Where the party's military authorities are in any way accountable to
their constituency, the risk of such deprivation being revealed
publicly might induce them to take precaution whereas they
otherwise would not have.

134.
A rule of strict liability encourages claims because they are easier to
litigate. See LANDES & POSNER supra note 77, at 65.
135.
Under jus in bello, let alone under jus ad bellum.
136.
If the civilians are not members of the non-state actor, then it is the
conduct of the civilians rather than that of the non-state actor's that must be
examined.
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The precautionary requirement in Article 58 of Additional
Protocol I applies to the defensive precautions of any party to a
conflict, making the above argument apposite to both state and nonstate actors. But to the extent that a strict liability rule makes
claims practicable, the defense of contributory fault would have a
greater effect on non-state actors. States have no remedy against
non-state actors, so they would remain unaffected. In contrast, a
non-state actor which so far has gained politically from a failure to
take precautionary requirements stands to lose if it maintains its
course of conduct. For example, during the 2006 war in Lebanon,
Lebanese civilians that could have been spared had they remained in
shelters were instead injured or killed.13 7 This was not a case of
deliberate use of civilians as human shields or of deliberate
targeting-simply put, neither the Lebanese Government nor
Hizbollah had built civilian shelters. 13 8 Had Israel's strict liability
been invoked in order to obtain compensation, Israel could have
credibly argued that the failure to construct shelters constituted
contributory fault. Lebanese civilians would then have been deprived
of some compensation because of their own authorities' conduct.
Domestic discontent might have ensued and affected Hizbollah's
public standing. Leaving aside whether or not anticipation of such
discontent would have moved the specific authorities involved to take
greater precautions in defense from attack, this situation
demonstrates how, under the proposed rule, a defense of contributory
fault becomes pertinent and raises the possibility of another influence
on parties' conduct-domestic public opinion.
In conclusion, the imposition of strict liability will not have the
same effect on state and non-state parties. However, it will not put a
state actor at a disadvantage in comparison with the non-state actor.
Therefore, a strict liability rule does not exacerbate the asymmetry of
conflicts. Moreover, there is a chance that it will induce parties,
particularly non-state actors, to take defensive precautions to
minimize harm to civilians.

137.
Cf. Anna Badkhen, Civilian Death Toll Raises Questions, S.F. CHRON., July
20, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/07/
20/CIVILIANS.TMP (demonstrating inevitability of Lebanese civilian casualties in the
Israeli-Hezbollah conflict).
138.
Cf. Thomas Wagner & Kathy Gannon, Israel Strikes Resume After Brief
Lull, S.F. CHRON., July 31, 2006, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article/
article?f=/n/a/2006/07/31/international/i05513OD90.DTL (explaining refugee status of
Lebanese civilians trying to avoid injury from the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict). See
COMMENTARY, supra note 14, at 694, for mention of shelters as the principal measure
of protection for civilians.
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F. Summary
The effect on armed conflict of a strict liability rule for injury to
civilians is not to eliminate all incidental injury. Whatever the
liability rule, rational injurers will take precautions only if they cost
less than the anticipated compensation to injured civilians.
Information deficits distort the calculation of these costs so that
under a negligence rule the injurer has an incentive to externalize the
cost of avoidable injury with the prospect of evading responsibility.
Theoretically, a strict liability rule with a defense of contributory
fault counters this incentive. It encourages the potential injurer to
take appropriate precautions in military attacks so as to minimize
injuries in the first place. It may also have other effects, going
beyond the conduct of specific attacks. This Part considered two
possibilities: first, that if the cost of compensation is high, a strict
liability rule may deter states from engaging in beneficial military
action; second, if the cost is low, it may erode the distinction between
legal and illegal attacks. Finally, this Part examined the operation of
a strict liability rule in conflicts between states and non-state actors.
None of the arguments supports the adoption or rejection of the
proposed obligation. It is now useful to examine other aspects of the
proposed obligation, including the actual costs of compensation and
enforcement.

IV. AN OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE FOR INCIDENTAL

INJURY AS A MEANS OF RECOVERY OF LOSSES

A. The Bearable Cheapness of Life and Limb
The previous Part examined the effect of an obligation to
compensate for incidental injury on the conduct of parties to a conflict
on the basis of two contradictory assumptions: one, that
compensation reflecting the cost of injury is significantly higher than
the cost of preventing the injury, and two, that compensation
reflecting the cost of injury is significantly lower than the cost of
The cost of prevention through precautionary
prevention. 139
measures differs according to circumstances. It depends on the type
of precautionary measure, agency, and the internalization of costs.140

139.
Posner and Sykes address this problem with respect to violations of the
laws of armed conflict. Posner & Sykes, supra note 67, at 21.
140.
As an example, the development of more precise weapons or risking the
lives of many of the attacking party's combatants (e.g., when substituting a ground
attack for an air strike), compared with a lower level of activity. The development of
more focused weapons that minimize incidental injury with respect to a given target
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For present purposes, it can be taken as a constant because it is not
subject to a normative definition. The present Subpart focuses on the
other element in the equation-the cost of compensation.
Ideally, the degree of compensation should flow from the goals it
serves, such as deterrence and redress. This can occur when the rate
of compensation is determined by a body external to the parties
involved, such as a court. In international law, the parties directly
determine the terms of their own obligations; compensation is then
dictated by other factors. An obligation to compensate incidentally
injured civilians will limit the parties' freedom of action in military
attacks but will still generate expenditures. States have, therefore,
no reason to agree on a high compensation scale. They might be
motivated to adhere to a rule of liability- and comply with it in
exchange for the moral gain that compliance with a morally laudable
scheme generates, but they can achieve this by agreeing on a
compensation scale that is negligible compared with the overall costs
of armed conflict.
There is little precedent of compensation in the absence of fault
on which to predict a scale to which states might realistically agree.
In isolated cases, states have offered ex gratia compensation for
141
mistakenly targeting civilians because of errors in identification.
There are even fewer cases of compensation offered for incidental
injury. The conflicts in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq since 2003
offer some insight into this practice.
U.S. military regulations allow judge advocates to offer ex gratia
solatia (condolence) payments to victims of incidents that cause
bodily injury, death, or loss of property. 14 2 This option is sometimes
used to compensate individuals injured in connection with combat
action when a combat exclusion precludes a tort claim. 143 U.S.
regulations allow such payments in countries where payment in
money or in kind to a victim or to a victim's family is customary as an
expression of sympathy or condolence, particularly within Asia and
the Middle East. 144 The individual or unit involved in the damage
Solatia payments are
has no legal obligation to pay solatia.

may also be a side effect of the development of more accurate weapons, which are more
likely to hit the chosen target. Schmitt, supra note 2, at 23.
See Marian Nash Leich, Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a
141.
HumanitarianBasis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 319, 319-24 (1989); Harold G. Maier, Ex Gratia
Payments and the IranianAirline Tragedy, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 325, 325-32 (1989). But
see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Looking Back and Looking Ahead, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 336,
336-41(1989).
10 U.S.C. § 2736 (2004).
142.
Karin Tackaberry, Judge Advocates Play a Major Role in Rebuilding Iraq:
143.
The Foreign Claims Act and Implementation of the Commander's Emergency Response
Program,2004 ARMY LAW. 39, 43 (2004).
144.
Jeremy Joseph, Mediation in War: Winning Hearts and Minds Using
Mediated Condolence Payments, 23 NEGOTIATION J. 219, 224-25 (2007).

214

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42..181

immediate and generally nominal. 14 5 On this basis, the U.S. offered
solatia payments in Vietnam in the 1960s 1 46 and in Afghanistan and
Iraq since 2004.147 By 2006, U.S. armed forces had paid out some $30
million in condolence and solatia payments to Iraqi and Afghan
civilians. 148 In Iraq, maximum individual solatia payments are
$2,500 for a death, $1,000 for a serious injury, and $500 for property
49
loss or damage.
A similar scheme exists in Canada. In 2005, Canada signed an
agreement with the Afghan government, waiving any liability for
damage it caused in Afghanistan. 150 However, the Canadian Federal
Treasury Board Policy on Claims and Ex Gratia Payments allows ex
gratiapayments to be offered "to anyone in the public interest for loss
or expenditure incurred for which there is no legal liability on the
part of the Crown. An ex gratia payment is an exceptional vehicle
used only when there is no statutory, regulatory or policy vehicle to
make the payment.' 15 1 In 2006, Canada offered a number of ex gratia
payments for incidental injury caused to civilians in Afghanistan, in
amounts of up to $9,000 per person. 152 A few small ex gratia
allowances have also been offered in Iraq by the UK 1 53 and by the

145.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, LEGAL SERVICES, CLAIMS PROCEDURES, PAMPHLET 27162 §10-10 (2008), available at http://www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/p27_162.pdf;
Joseph, supra note 144, at 224.
146.
John Fabian Witt, Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency
Damages 10 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group,
Paper No. 08-181, 2008), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096587.
147.
In November 2004, a U.S. Department of Defense General Counsel
memorandum stated that solatia is a custom in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. ARMY,
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S LEGAL CTR. AND SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK
149 (2007), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/armyllaw2007.pdf [hereinafter
OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK].
148.
Witt, supra note 146, at 6-7. See Jonathan Tracy, Condolence Payments,
CIVIC, July 2006, http://www.civicworldwide.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task
=view&id=27&Itemid=77, for a discussion of US condolence payments in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
149.
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 147, at 270.
150.
Tom Blackwell, Ottawa on the Hook for Harm to Afghans, NAT'L POST, Apr.
23, 2008, available at http:lwww.nationalpost.com/news/worldluselection/timeline/
story.html?id=466785.
151.
Treasury Board of Canadian Secretariat: Policy on Claims and Ex Gratia,
http://www.tbs-sct.gc.calpolldoc-eng.aspx?id=12197&section=text#3
(last visited Dec.
22, 2008).
152.
Blackwell, supra note 150. Not all payments are for incidental injury
resulting from combat action. Id. Reported payments for clearly incidental combatrelated injuries range from $1,120 and $1,981 for an "Afghan hit by ricochet from
Canadian shot" to $2,000 for the "death of [an] Afghan civilian during 'rules of
engagement' escalation" to almost $8,000 "for an incident in May, 2006, when a
Canadian vehicle carrying an unnamed Afghan was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade."
Id. This report was based on information disclosed under the Canadian Access to
Information Act. Id.
153.
416 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 140WH (statement of Mr. Adam
Ingram, Minister of State, Ministry of Defense).
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NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan. 154 Australia's FinancialManagement and Accountability Act
1997 authorizes "act of grace" payments in circumstances in which the
Commonwealth considers it has a moral, rather than legal, obligation
to provide redress in relation to losses directly caused by its acts or
omissions. 155 Payments of over US$50,000 per person 156 have been
made in Iraq and Afghanistan under this Act, although reports refer
only to mistaken identification of victims rather than incidental
injury.
Resort to ex gratia payments, sometimes to circumvent the
inability to award legal compensation because of the combat
exclusion, demonstrates that the injuring party perceives the benefit
resulting from payment as greater than its immediate cost. However,
this cannot be regarded as an application of the strict liability
proposal made here. First, ex gratiapayments are ordinarily limited
in size, so that the immediate cost is very low and does not cover the
loss. Second, the payment is not intended to allow restitutio ad
integrum but to substitute an admission of guilt and to reflect good
will. Indeed, the target audience of ex gratia payments is hardly the
direct victim, but rather the Afghani or Iraqi public in general. The
purpose of these ex gratiapayments is to "win the hearts and minds,"
or to ensure the goodwill of local populations, thus allowing the
injuring state to maintain positive relations with a host nation in
whose territory it operates. 157 The U.S. military authorization to
make the payment typically justifies the payment in that "[b]y
making this condolence payment, MNF [(multinational force)]
ensures the family and community recognize the MNFs' sympathy for
the unfortunate occurrence. Support will positively influence both
the community and local Iraqi leaders.' 5 8 Ex gratia payments are
limited to a discrete type of conflict, even if those constitute the
principal conflicts in which the U.S. and its allies have been involved
since World War II. These are conflicts where the injuring Western
powers have perceived their opponents not as a monolithic enemy but
as a mixture of potential allies and enemy insurgents. The objectives
of the Western powers have been broader than merely a military
counterinsurgency victory, and include nation- and state-building and

154.
Ron Synovitz, Afghanistan: NATO Begins Fund for Civilian War Victims,
RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, Jan. 26, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/contentl
Article/1074305.html.
Financial Management and Accountability Act, 1997, § 33(1) (Austl.).
155.
Tom Hyland, How We Pay Iraq When Diggers Kill, AGE, July 2, 2006,
156.
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national]how-we-pay-iraq-when-diggerski11l2006/07/
01/1 151174441322.html?page=fullpage.
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 147, at 149.
157.
E.g., Memorandum from Headquarters, 256th Brigade Combat Team,
158.
Department of the Army to the Chief of Staff, 3d Infantry Division (June 3, 2005),
available at http://www.aclu.org/natsec/foia/log.html.

216

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:.181

reconstruction. These powers also maintain a visible presence among
the civilian population. 159 Given these unique characteristics, and
particularly the purpose of payment, it would be wrong to draw
conclusions from the practice in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq that
the Western powers would be willing to pay compensation for
incidental injuries caused to "proper" enemy civilians beyond the
context of an occupation. If anything, this practice demonstrates that
even when payment is voluntary and entirely at the discretion of the
states, they do not exhibit great benevolence.
To conclude, the political price for adopting a rule which
obligates states to pay compensation may be a formally endorsed low
valuation of human life, and consequently the absence of any
deterring effect. Overall, strict liability for civilian injury might be
feasible only because it requires little change in practice, and even
offers a cloak of legitimacy at only a marginal cost. The low valuation
may also affect claims for wrongful acts. Although the scale need not
be identical for incidental injury and for fault-based injury, some
relationship between the two can be assumed. Because ensuring
appropriate compensation and minimizing injury push in opposite
directions in this case, it is again a choice between two evils: one
possibility is to maintain existing law, in which case civilians are
unlikely to receive compensation even for wrongful conduct, and the
other is to adopt a strict liability rule to ensure redress for victims of
both wrongful and faultless conduct, but at a lower scale.
B. Claim Mechanisms
Liability alone is "no threat to the judgment-proof. 16 0 Thus, a
proposal for a new obligation on states raises the problem of
enforcement. There are many rules in international law that are not
enforceable by any existing dispute-settlement institution and are
nonetheless effective. However, to the extent that the rule of strict
liability aims to enhance compliance with an already-existing
obligation to minimize injury, it adds little to existing law if it is not
enforced. Similarly, an abstract entitlement to compensation without
the possibility of enforcement is of little assistance to victims of
armed conflict.
A further question is whether the right to compensation should
belong to the individual or the targeted state. 161 The issue lies at the

159.
Joseph, supra note 144, at 222-23.
160.
Richard L. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
445, 460 (David Kairys ed., 1998).
161.
Cf. Rainer Hofmann, Andrea Friedrich & Friedrich Rosenfeld, Draft
Declaration of International Law Principles on Reparation for Victims of Armed
Conflict (Substantive Issues), ILA Committee on Reparation for Victims of Armed
Conflict, art. 4 (Sept. 2007) (on file with the author).
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intersection of the laws of armed conflict, which are generally
applicable between states, and international human rights law, which
focuses on individuals. A choice between the possible mechanisms
depends on various factors, including the exact scope of the
obligation, e.g., whether liability is linked to violation of ius ad
bellum. Accordingly, the following is only a general outline of
possible mechanisms for both types of claims.
1.

Institutions for Individual Claims

Domestic courts seem to be the natural forum for tort claims.
However, procedural obstacles are obvious. First, jurisdiction would
be limited to the courts of the injuring state, the targeted state, and
third states whose nationals were injured. 16 2 In the latter two cases,
state immunity will block the claim. 16 3 As for the courts of the
164
injuring state, claimants are unlikely to have access to them.
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. For example,
Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been
able, from the outset of the Israeli occupation, to bring claims against
Israel in Israeli courts. Although the policy of the Israeli executive
and judiciary of allowing such claims-without bars of jurisdiction,
as
justiciability, or standing-is related to the status of the territories 166
occupied, 165 this practice also extended to other "enemy civilians,"
such as residents of Lebanon. 167 Moreover, for a short period of time,
Israeli law envisaged the possibility of granting compensation to
Palestinian victims of incidental injury. In 2005, Israel's law on state
liability for civil torts was amended, expanding the already existing
combat exclusion clause1 68 to cover injuries caused by Israel's security

Kimberly C. Priest-Hamilton, Comment, Who Really Should Have
162.
Exercised Jurisdiction Over the Military Pilots Implicated in the 1998 Italy Gondola
Accident, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 605, 609 (2000).
HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 11 (2002).
163.
The present discussion assumes that, to the extent that domestic law
164.
regards combat-related claims as nonjusticiable, this bar will be removed. Otherwise,
there is no cause of action in a domestic court of the injuring party.
165.
On the history and politics of this policy, see DAVID KRETZMER, THE
OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE 19-25 (2002).

This term is used loosely as there is no definition of an "enemy" under
166.
Israeli law.
Some Lebanese claims concerned Israel's conduct as an occupying power in
167.
Lebanon, e.g., HCJ 102/82 Zemel v. Minister of Defense [1983] IsrSC 37(3) 365.
However, there were claims related to combat activity but not to occupation, and even
then questions of jurisdiction and standing were not raised, e.g., HCJ 574/82 El Nawar
v. The Minister of Defense [1985] IsrSC 39(3) 449 (a claim by a Lebanese civilian for
taking of property during Israel's 1982 war in Lebanon). Most other claims concerned
Israeli actions in Lebanon and in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as occupied
territories.
Civil Torts (State Liability), art. 5, 1952 (Isr.).
168.
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forces in the West Bank under almost any circumstance. 169 To soften
the consequences of that expansion, the amendment also established
a committee authorized to grant ex gratia compensation to persons in
conflict zones whose claims were otherwise excluded. 170 This would
have permitted ex gratia compensation for any injury, including
incidental injury caused by military operations. 171 In the end,
however, the exclusion of claims was struck down by the Israeli
Supreme Court as unconstitutional, and with it the establishment of
172
the ex gratiacommittee.
Another mechanism
for individual claims-international
tribunals-is also limited. The European Court of Human Rights and
the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights have
173
limited mandates, circumscribed by their constitutive documents.
Whether the laws of armed conflict can be brought within the scope of
these mandates is a controversial issue. 174
The International
Criminal Court's Rome Statute creates a compensation fund for

169.
Id. art. 5C(a). This followed Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip.
170.
Even outside the context of "combat immunity." Id. art. 5C(b).
171.
A restrictive reading of the clause suggests that the ex gratia compensation
would have been limited to injury caused through negligent conduct. Assaf Jacob,
Immunity Under Fire: State Immunity for Damage Caused by Combat Action, 33
MISHPATIM 107, 180 n.214 (2003) (Isr.). This interpretation is implicitly supported by
the Supreme Court's ruling. See HCJ 8276/05 Adalah v. Minister of Defence [2006]
(Isr.), translated by HaMoked, Center for the Defence of the Individual, available at
http://www.hamoked.org.il/items/318-eng.pdf. After rejecting the excessive expansion
of combat immunity as disproportionate and therefore unconstitutional, the Court
noted that the possibility of ex gratia compensation did not mitigate the
disproportionality. Id.
146, 164. Since it was in response to an illegitimate denial of
a right to claim, the compensation would not have been ex gratia but required by law.
Id.
90. The Court appears to have assumed that the ex gratia compensation would
have been available to people with otherwise valid fault-based claims that were
rejected because of the immunity clause. Id.
33.
172.
See Adalah, HCJ 8276/05,
160-164.
173.
These constitutive documents for the European Court of Human Rights
include the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and its protocols. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. 11, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?NT=005&CL=ENG.
The constitutive documents for the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights include the American Convention on
Human Rights, art. 33, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; the
Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 106, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S.
3; and the Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Res.
447 (IX-0/79), 9th Sess., O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, Vol. 1 at 88 (1979).
174.
Emiliano J Buis, From La Tablada to Guantanamo Bay: The Challenge of
New Conflict Situations in the Experience of the Inter-American System of Human
Rights Protection, presented at Complementing IHL: Exploring the Need for Additional
Norms To Govern Contemporary Conflict Situations (Jerusalem, June 1-3, 2008) (draft
paper, on file with the author).
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victims, but entitlement depends on individual responsibility under
the Statute, 175 which requires not only fault but also intent.
Another mechanism may be
an international victim
compensation fund based on compulsory state contributions. 176 It is
difficult to imagine, however, that states will agree to establish such
a fund. Those that regard themselves as potentially targeted parties,
as well as states that consider themselves unlikely to be involved in
conflict, can donate the monies directly to their own nationals or to
other states when the need arises and at their own discretion. States
that regard themselves as potential injurers have no reason to
contribute to such a fund and thereby subsidize other potential
injurers. If they intend to compensate the victims of their attacks,
they can do so directly when the occasion arises. Such a fund would
not include non-state actors that are not identifiable in advance of the
conflict and are unlikely to be granted the privilege of participating.
Contributions would, therefore, be lacking.
Moreover, like any
insurance mechanism, a victim compensation fund provides a
disincentive to take precautions. Liability then has less deterrent
effect on injuring states. In short, a universal compensation fund
seems impractical.
Any individual claim mechanism runs the risks of inefficiency
and inaccessibility, which would enable injuring states to evade
liability. However, the UNCC, which offers relief to large numbers of
individual claimants through comparatively simple and expeditious
administrative procedures, 177 has proven that this is not inevitable.
2.

State Claims

Tort litigation has significant drawbacks as a means for
providing coverage of loss. For one, it is a costly method. 178 In
addition, it has been argued that tort law is an inappropriate tool for
dealing with damage caused by military activity. 179 For example,
military activity is routinely hazardous, making the presumption of
ultrahazardous activity inapplicable. Other evidentiary rules of tort
law are also problematic. A different line of argument is that tort law
envisages a dispute between two individuals, while military activity

175.
U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the
InternationalCriminal Court, art. 79, UN doc. AICONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998).
176.
Under this proposal, voluntary contributions need not go through an
international institution.
177.
See John R. Crook, The United Nations Compensation Commission-A New
Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 144, 145 (1993).
178.
Specifically, with respect to negligence, see POSNER, supra note 23, at 181.
179.
Atif Rehman, Note, The Court of Last Resort: Seeking Redress for Victims of
Abu-Ghraib Torture Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
493, 517-18 (2006).
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typically generates mass claims. The difficulty of adjudicating a case
involving policy and budgetary considerations of a state has already
been pointed 8 out.
Finally, the basic tenet of tort law-namely,
"special risk"l 0 -is not intended to cover a risk that is common to the
entire state community or to large parts of it, as well as to residents
of other parties to the conflict. In view of all these problems, the
question arises whether a mechanism based on tort liability of the
injuring party is truly the most efficient way of compensating
18 1
victims.
The traditional form of dispute settlement under international
law is between states.18 2 The right to compensation attaches to the
targeted state, which adopts the claims of its nationals and presents a
claim to the injuring state.1 8 3 Any compensation that the targeted
state receives belongs to the state itself, and it enjoys discretion
regarding whether and how to distribute the proceeds among injured
individuals.
The conspicuous advantage of an inter-state claim as compared
with individual claims, whether in the courts of the injuring state or
in that of the targeted state, is efficiency. The apparent shortcoming
of state claims is that they do not guarantee that the injured
individuals will receive compensation. Granted, the targeted state
18 4
generally has an interest in rehabilitating its population.
However, whether it does so through collective facilities or on an
individual basis is left to the state to determine according to its needs
and priorities. There might be instances when the interests of the
state do not correspond to those of the victim population, even
indirectly.18 5 Two possible examples are when the victims hail from
an ethnic community that is marginalized by state authorities, and
when the governing authorities are for whatever reason insufficiently
accountable to the population.' 8 6 Alternatively, the targeted state

180.
See GRAHAM STEPHENSON, SOURCEBOOK ON TORT LAW 54 (2d ed. 2000).
181.
Jacob, supra note 171, at 138-40.
182.
See Jessica Bodack, Note, International Law for the Masses, 15 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 363, 363-66 (2005).
183.
For example, "[t]he Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission was established
and operates pursuant to Article 5 of the Agreement signed in Algiers on December 12,
2000 between the Governments of the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia." Permanent Court of Arbitration: Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id=1151 (last visited Dec. 22,
2008).
184.
States may only adopt the claims of their nationals, whereas victims may or
may not be residents of the targeted state.
185.
This is the underlying premise of human rights law.
186.
An example from another field is the claim that pension monies transferred
by Israel to the Palestinian Authority following the signing of the Interim Accord in
1995 reached the private accounts of Palestinian leaders rather than the civil servants
to whom they belong and for whom they were intended. RACHEL EHRENFELD, WHERE
DOES THE MONEY GO?: A STUDY OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 7 (2002), available at

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.orgljsource/Peace/ehrenfeld.html.
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might decide not to present a claim or to waive its right altogether, as
part of a peace agreement, for example. This may be politically,
economically, or otherwise justifiable, but the individual victim
nonetheless remains empty-handed. Furthermore, the injuring state
might in certain circumstances expect an eventual waiver of claims,
so that the obligation will have little effect on its conduct.
3.

A Combined Mechanism

Perhaps an optimal mechanism to ensure that the individual
victim is compensated without the drawbacks of reliance on
individual claims against the injuring state is domestic social
insurance or statutory entitlement combined with an international
claim for reimbursement. Under such a scheme, the burden of
providing compensation for victims of military attacks, including
incidentally injured victims, will be placed in the first instance on the
targeted state. That state would be obligated to compensate the
individual victim for his or her losses under a domestic social
insurance or statutory benefits scheme. The state would then have a
right to recoup its losses from the injuring state through an
international claim.
Economically, first-party liability through domestic benefits is
ordinarily more efficient than third-party liabilitys 7 Only where
first-party insurance is unavailable or prohibitively costly, which is
rare, is liability insurance better justifiedSS
Social insurance and statutory schemes are not mandated by the
laws of armed conflict.i 8 9 The impetus for instituting such insurance
correlates to the extent to which a state considers itself a victim of
military attacks. Israel has had extensive legislation. providing
benefits to victims of hostilities since its inception. 19 In recent years,
various states that had not previously had social security schemes for
victims of hostilities have enacted such arrangements. 19 1 Notably,
192
such legislation was often spurred primarily by terrorist attacks,

187.
For example, the cost of information gathering is likely to be smaller and
the need to internalize costs greater, than for the injuring state.
188.
Betsy J. Grey, Homeland Security and Federal Relief A Proposal for a
Permanent Compensation System for Domestic Terrorist Victims, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 663, 693 (2006).
189.
An obligation to provide benefits to victims of armed conflict may be based
on human rights obligations, to the extent that the injury results in a person's inability
to provide for him- or herself, requires special assistance, etc.
190.
Law on Benefits to Victims in Periphery Area, 1956 (Isr.); The Benefits for
Victims of Hostilities Law, 1970 (Isr.).
191.
BERNHARD A. KOCH, EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON LEGAL CO-OPERATION
(CDCJ), REPORT ON INDEMNIFYING VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 19, 18-23 (2006), available
at http://www.coe.intlt/e/legal-affairs/legal-co-operation/steering-committees/cdcj/CJ-SVICT/CDCJ-BU%20(2006)%2019%20e%20-%20ECTIL%2OReport.pdf.
192.
See Grey, supra note 188, at 664.
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suggesting that it addresses specific difficulties that do not arise in an
ordinary inter-state conflict, most obviously the absence of a
defendant entity.
In addition, these situations are not clearly
governed by public international law, 193 and are thus of limited
relevance in the present context.
An international legal obligation on states to provide domestic
benefits to their own citizens or residents for injury caused by the
enemy during armed conflict will not result in uniform domestic
legislation. Such arrangements are dictated by domestic policy and
budgetary considerations that vary from state to state. For this
reason, international law neither can nor should govern the
administration of benefits. It can at most create the obligation to
provide a benefit scheme with certain indispensable elements.
The possibility that a targeted state would decide not to claim its
losses also exists under the combined mechanism. The advantage of
the combined mechanism is that the targeted state may legitimately
retain its freedom of action, but not at the expense of the individual
victim.
However, reliance on domestic benefits also has its
weaknesses. First, domestic benefits disbursed by the targeted state
provide little incentive for the injuring party to minimize injuries. In
addition, domestic benefits are preferable to tort liability only if they
are available in practice.
There may be various reasons why a
targeted party would not offer benefits to its civilians. One possibility
is that the targeted party is a failed or failing state. It might not even
be a state. 194 For many reasons, a functioning state also might not
provide benefits. It is not clear that such failure is a breach of
international law. If the obligation is limited to essential elements, it
may not be able to justify its failure to act by financial inability. In
any case, such an obligation would be difficult to enforce. If a claim
by an individual against a foreign state is difficult to realize, a claim
by an individual against his or her own state is even more so. An
unrealized right to benefits leaves the injured individual emptyhanded. 195

193.
They are governed rather by domestic and international criminal law and,
at best the law of non-international armed conflict. A case in point is the U.S.
legislation following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, setting up the
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund. See Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act, title IV, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001). However, the main
goal of the fund was protect the airlines from civil suits, not to substitute for the
perpetrator's liability. Cf. id. § 408.
194.
Since this article is limited to international armed conflict, this line of
argument will not be pursued further, although it is arguable that under unique
circumstances, an international armed conflict might extend to non-state parties.
Cf. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Government of Israel [2005],
29-40 (Isr.), available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/filesengO2/690/007/A34/0200769
0.a34.htm.
195.
In domestic law, one can imagine a more complex system under which an
individual victim may choose, subject to limitations, between a statutory benefit from
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Political Enforcement

Even in the absence of judicial dispute-settlement mechanisms,
enforcement is possible in the international arena. Parties to a
conflict may be judgment-proof, but not sanction-proof. The political
will required for any sanction is, of course, no small matter. In
addition, the difference in operation between political and judicial
institutions must be taken into account. If enforcement through
political institutions purports to reflect legal standards, the legal
standards must be easy to apply. Since a rule of strict liability is
simple and renders liability practically self-evident, states have a
legal basis on which to establish a political demand that a state pay
compensation. This simplicity may nonetheless be frustrated by the
defense of contributory fault, as discussed in Part III.
One example of a political enforcement mechanism is the United
Nations Compensation Commission. However, its value as a model
for other conflicts is limited, not only because of the political
circumstances surrounding its establishment, but also because it
relied on the ability of the international community to extract
compensation from Iraq. 196 The same result is not guaranteed for
other potentially liable states.
5.

Conclusion

Each of the potential enforcement mechanisms examined has its
advantages and weaknesses. The choice between them depends
primarily on who are identified as the legal victim and claimant and
on the scope of the entitlement to compensation.

V. SUMMARY

This Article explores the idea that states should be held strictly
liable for incidental injury that they cause in the course of military
attacks, without being held internationally responsible for the injury.
This approach takes into account the sad reality that, currently, the
law does little to restrain states' targeting policies and leaves
innocent civilians bearing the costs of their loss. The primary
purpose of strict liability is to provide prompt and appropriate
compensation to victims by divorcing international liability from
international responsibility. The main issue addressed here is the

the state and a tort claim against the injurer. An international law equivalent is not
impossible, though difficult to envision at the current stage of development of
individual rights.
196.
Status of Processing and Payment of [UNCC] Claims, http://www.uncc.ch/
status.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).
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effect that such a scheme might have on the conduct of parties to a
conflict. Strict liability is not proposed in order to prohibit all injuries
to civilians, and this Article does not pretend that complete avoidance
of injury to civilians is a realistic goal. Strict liability can, at most,
reduce avoidable injuries to a minimum and provide redress to those
injured.
A theoretical economic analysis suggests that a strict liability
regime may encourage states to change their military strategies, both
by investing greater resources in avoiding injury and by reducing
their level of military activity. The relevance of economic analysis
and its practical implications are nonetheless controversial. The
utility of the proposal depends largely on the relative weight of
economic considerations in states' policies.
States sometimes pay compensation to civilian victims of
military attack despite believing that they are not obligated to do so.
They do so for political reasons and do not see such compensation as a
reflection on the legality of their own military conduct that led to the
injury. Thus, it is not inconceivable that states would agree to pay
compensation for incidental injury to civilians, but such a scheme
may have an adverse effect on the goals of adequate compensation
and avoidance of injuries.
Additional arguments may be put forward against an obligation
to compensate all victims of military attacks. For example, when
combatants or civilians directly involved in hostilities as described in
Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I fail to distinguish themselves
from noncombatant civilians, 197 injuring parties would be more
resistant to compensating the injured, naturally wishing to avoid
compensating de facto combatants 198 of the other party, who would
clearly be outside the scope of international entitlement to
compensation, even under the proposed rule. One answer to this
argument is that this problem is no different from other false claims
in civil proceedings. 199 If the onus is on the claimant to prove
eligibility, proof of civilian status is no exception.
A more general response, also by way of conclusion, is that it is
probably difficult to establish the instrumental utility of an obligation
to compensate incidentally injured victims of armed conflict, in
addition to pre-existing state responsibility for fault-based injuries.
This Article responds to some concerns in this regard but recognizes
that there are no watertight solutions. The proposed obligation might
prove less than economically efficient, yet this alone does not mean

197.
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 51(3). This is a characteristic
problem when the conflict is with a non-state actor, but need not be unique to it.
198.
The use of these words is not an attempt to create a new category of
individuals under the laws of armed conflict, nor is it an attempt to rename an existing
category.
199.
Cf. Jacob, supra note 171, at 185 n.229.
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that it is not worthy of consideration, because it reflects, first and
foremost, a moral commitment to victims that can be evaluated
irrespective of its economic implications. If the commitment is found
morally justified, it may be the basis for a new obligation. At the
same time, the proposed obligation's potentially adverse consequences
on states' conduct must not be ignored. Instead, they should be met
by fine-tuning the obligation and its implementing mechanisms so as
to minimize its deficiencies. Although a tall order, this might not be
impossible. In the long run, liability may combine with expanding
restrictions on ius in bello-e.g., restrictions on the use of certain
weapons-and linkages between ius ad bellum and ius in bello to
modify current perceptions of the legality of conduct in armed
conflict.
The present inquiry may advance the development of
international law by shedding new light on familiar problems.

